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Abstract
Since coming to prominence, Donald Trump’s politics has regularly been likened to 
fascism. Many experts within fascism studies have tried to engage with wider media 
and political debates on the relevance (or otherwise) of such comparisons. In the 
debate ‘Donald Trump and Fascism Studies’ we have invited leading academics with 
connections to the journal and those who are familiar with debates within fascism 
studies, to offer thoughts on how to consider the complex relationship between 
fascism, the politics of Donald Trump, and the wider maga movement. Contributors 
to this debat are: Mattias Gardell, Ruth Wodak, Benjamin R. Teitelbaum, David Renton, 
Nigel Copsey, Raul Cârstocea, Maria Bucur, Brian Hughes, and Roger Griffin.
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Since coming to prominence, Donald Trump’s politics has regularly been lik-
ened to fascism. Many experts within fascism studies have tried to engage with 
wider media and political debates on the relevance (or otherwise) of such 
comparisons. Most have urged that contrasts should be drawn between the 
fascist past and whatever we might want to term the present, though no-one 
seems to suggest there are no similarities between Trump’s politics and fas-
cism (however it may be defined). Moreover, many have suggested that fascist 
elements operate within at least part of the wider movement – or set of move-
ments – that have developed around Trump’s politics.
Following the unprecedented events of 6 January 2021 in America, some 
voices in this debate also felt that things had changed. Most notably, Robert 
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Paxton, who had previously resisted categorising Trump as a fascist, wrote an 
article for Newsweek explaining: ‘Trump’s incitement of the invasion of the 
Capitol on January 6, 2020 removes my objection to the fascist label. His open 
encouragement of civic violence to overturn an election crosses a red line. The 
label now seems not just acceptable but necessary.’1
At Fascism, we have invited leading academics with connections to the jour-
nal and those who are familiar with debates within fascism studies, to offer 
thoughts on how to consider the complex relationship between fascism, the 
politics of Donald Trump, and the wider maga movement. We asked contrib-
utors to limit their comments to a short statement of around five hundred 
words, and these collectively have been able to capture a range of important 
observations for future scholarly analysis of these issues. It is hoped these 
commentaries will help develop this debate in analytically constructive ways, 
and in particular prove useful for those engaged in researching contemporary 
forms of fascism, as well as the wider extreme and populist radical right.
Mattias Gardell, Professor at the Centre for Multidisciplinary 
Studies on Racism, University of Uppsala
Does Trump and the political force he unleashed signal the return of fascism to 
mainstream politics? If so, in what respect? Discussing whether Trump himself 
is a fascist may not be the most fruitful endeavour. Trump may be many things; 
a narcissist with a grandiose sense of self, a compulsive confabulator, a popu-
list charlatan, but there is not much to indicate that he is politically conscious, 
or even interested enough to have adopted an ideology of any sort, including 
fascism. Yet, his maga campaign positioned the key fascist vision of national 
rebirth at the centre of political attention, and we are well advised to remember 
that also Hitler and Mussolini could be dismissed as egomaniacs, half-insane 
rascals, big-mouths, and buffoons, by mainstream commentators at the time.
The maga vision obviously touches a nerve in popular, predominantly white, 
American imagination, nurtured by layers of (not always frictionless) banal 
nationalism, Americanism, nativism, white supremacy, manifest destiny, and 
racialized discourse and practice. White liberal Americans were chocked when 
Trump in 2016 gained 63 million votes, Black Americans less so. ‘This is the US 
we know’, one of my old African American interlocutors said. If fascism gains a 
hold in the mainstream, it will grow from within. This informs us that fascism 
1 Robert Paxton, ‘I’ve hesitated to Call Donald Trup a Fascist. Until Now,’ Newsweek, January 11, 2021, 
accessed February 21, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/robert-paxton-trump-fascist-1560652.
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should not be seen as alien to, but part of, the societies in which it competes for 
hegemony. Of course, no society exists in isolation. The breakthrough of Trump 
and the maga campaign cannot only be explained by domestic factors, but 
should also be studied in relation to the current surge of radical nationalisms 
around the world, and the process of globalization they are part and protest of.
A key driver of the maga campaign is politicized nostalgia, by which the 
anxieties of the present are contrasted to the imagined happiness of a lost/
stolen/abandoned, but not undead past. Of course, nostalgia is not exclusive 
to fascism, but permeates popular culture as evidenced by retro style trends in 
design, fashion, art, music, and film. This is important as a return of fascist ele-
ments to mainstream politics requires their embeddedness in popular desire. 
Marketing the past may make people miss what they never had, and hence 
cannot have lost, which may open an avenue for mainstreaming the yearning 
to ‘Make the Nation Great Again’.
The maga vision is vague enough to allow people from various walks of 
life to project different hopes of what it may entail. Most Trump voters were 
not necessarily fascist, but some were. Galvanized by the maga call was a het-
erogenous milieu of white nationalists, radical traditionalists, alt-right identi-
tarians, conspiracy exposers, militias, neo-confederates, and sovereign citizens 
that Trump knowingly catered to. Millions of Americans shared the dream of 
national rebirth, though not necessarily what it was supposed to mean. By 2020, 
some were disenchanted with what they had got. However, most remained 
enthused, and willing to dismiss every contradiction in Trump’s words and 
deeds, and Trump increased his support by 11 million votes. Politics does not 
only depend on rational reason, but has an important affective dimension 
which fascism frequently caters to.
Trump’s ousting will hardly be the end of story. Even if he sticks to golf and 
his Florida resort, Trump’s 74 million voters and their grievances are still out 
there, and there are already contenders to his throne elected to congress and 
other institutions of mainstream politics.
Ruth Wodak, Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies 
at Lancaster University
Many papers are currently discussing the so-called ‘Trump-phenomenon’: Is 
Trump himself a fascist? Is Trumpism a fascist movement? Is it still possible to 
use the concept of ‘fascism’ or does the term only refer to Mussolini’s Fascism, 
Austro-Fascism, Mosley’s Blackshirts or Spanish Franquismo of the 1920s and 
1930s? How do concepts such as ‘alt-right’, ‘ultra-nationalism’, ‘extreme-right’, 
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‘illiberalism’, ‘neo-authoritarianism’, ‘identitarianism’ (and many more) relate 
to ‘fascism’ per se? Are these sanitizing, euphemistic concepts, attempting to 
avoid the negative connotations of the original term?
Actually, it does not make sense to lose oneself in terminological debates. 
Nor is it useful to speculate if Trump is or is not a fascist. Scholars have not 
had the chance to observe Trump’s ‘backstage’ to be able to judge his person-
ality features, apart from his publicly staged performances. Clearly however, 
when studying his biography, he frequently changed positions, for example, 
from supporting the Democrats to standing as Republican presidential can-
didate. In his thirst for power, money and public recognition, Trump could be 
viewed as an ‘entertaining, very persuasive salesman’, selling whatever it takes 
to achieve his aims, supported (and instrumentalized) by his ideologues.
Accordingly, following semioticians and discourse analysts such as Umberto 
Eco, Michael Billig and John E Richardson, a focus on the range of discursive 
and material practices realizing and implementing the ideological positions 
of the Trump administration, fostered by ideologues such as Steven Bannon, 
is recommended. Moreover, the socio-political, historical as well as situative 
contexts are relevant: Trump(ism) did not occur spontaneously; its ideological 
roots and rhetoric reach back to other nativist, extremist politicians like Barry 
Goldwater and fundamentalist, conservative movements like the Tea-Party 
which defied Barack Obama’s presidency, supported and financed by (huge 
parts of) the gop, media tycoons, and corporatism. Such movements which 
strategically manipulate the frustrations and anxieties of many people, while 
distracting them from their objective source, through offering emotionally and 
ideologically laden concepts such as obedience, honour, duty, the fatherland 
or race, and focusing on ‘enemies’ (i.e., scapegoats) who allegedly threaten the 
longed-for sense of community, can be defined as fascist.2
Trump’s rhetoric applies salient discursive practices of fascism, both on-line 
and offline. On the one hand, he was the figurehead via his rallies and prop-
agandistic Twitter politics (34,000 Tweets in the period of June 2015 until 8 
January 2021); simultaneously, many diverse groupuscules on manifold digi-
tal platforms assembled under (t)his umbrella, all connected with each other 
to construct a ‘digital fascism’.3 Scandalisation, provocation, transgression of 
taboos, hate incitement, and violation of norms and conventions were part 
and parcel of Trump’s daily performance. Of course, such incidents not only 
guarantee many headlines and much (positive and negative) resonance; they 
2 Martin Kitchen, Fascism (London: Macmillan 1976), 86.
3 Marik Fielitz and Holger Marks, ‘Digital Fascism: Challenges for the Open Society in Times of 
Social Media,’ CRWS Working Papers (2019), accessed February 12, 2021, https://escholarship.
org/uc/item/87w5c5gp.
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also serve as distraction (i.e. ‘dead cat-strategy’) from specific policies intended 
to challenge and undermine democratic institutions, such as independent leg-
islation, press freedom or democratic elections.
Typically, the rhetoric of Trump and his followers was based on the 
Manichean division of ‘us’ (the ‘real, pure, white’ Americans) and ‘them’ 
(Muslims, migrants, refugees, leftists and liberals, intellectuals, etc.); on mobi-
lizing weaponized chants at rallies; and on encouraging his supporters to use 
violence against alleged enemies. As historian Timothy Snyder rightly main-
tained, ‘this [Trumpism] has everything to do with race from top to bottom’.4 
Trump explicitly contemplated that Hillary Clinton should be assassinated 
while continuously repeating the phrase ‘crooked Hillary’; and he launched 
traditional antisemitic tropes of a ‘Jewish World Conspiracy’ claiming that phi-
lanthropist George Soros was responsible both for the influx of so-called ‘illegal 
migrants’ from Mexico and for political opposition. Moreover, serious media 
and facts were delegitimized, ‘alternative facts’ and lies legitimized. He openly 
sided with ‘Proud Boys’ and equated antisemitic, white supremacists with 
anti-fascist demonstrators. Such ‘dangerous speech’5 was further enhanced by 
expressions of blatant machismo and misogyny. Obviously, discursive prac-
tices constitute and manifest realities – Trump’s rhetoric thus accompanied 
and also enabled authoritarian policies and practices. 
Benjamin R. Teitelbaum, Assistant Professor of Ethnomusicology 
and International Affairs, University of Colorado Boulder
Is fascism a historic or a diachronic phenomenon? If it is the latter, do today’s 
far-right populists qualify as fascists?
I’ve always felt uninspired by these discussions because I consider their 
conditions too trivial. We can identify similarities and dissimilarities among 
far-rightists past and present, and we can argue that some generic visions and 
behaviours are more distinguishing of historic fascism, at least, than others. 
But I don’t see how those analyses could allow us to take the crucial final step: 
to allege that a contemporary actor is not merely fascist-like but fully fascist. 
And yet as I equivocate in that historiographical debate, I unequivocally reject 
using the term to refer to figures like Donald Trump today, and do so based on 
epistemological and pedagogical grounds.
4 ‘“This has everything to do with race from top to bottom” – Prof Timothy Snyder on Capitol siege,’ 
Channel4.com, January 7, 2021, accessed February 12, 2021, https://www.channel4.com/news/
this-has-everything-to-do-with-race-from-top-to-bottom-prof-timothy-snyder-on-capitol-siege.
5 Dangerous Speech, accessed February 12, 2021, https://dangerousspeech.org/.
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Invoking the term today signals an end of inquiry. Whereas ideological map-
pings of the contemporary far-right might include jarringly unfamiliar moni-
kers like anarcho-capitalists, race materialists, right-wing nihilists, and so on, 
everyone thinks they know fascism. Moreover, if there’s one thing everyone 
knows about fascism, it’s that they already know enough. It is the cause that 
liberal democracies cannot tolerate and the foremost manifestation of human-
ity’s capacity for evil—what’s left to say? It follows that professional and lay 
scholars often reflexively consider fascism as the utmost extreme in radical 
right-wing politics. If more contemporary far-right movements are regarded as 
facades concealing something more sinister, that something is fascism. Refer 
to a cause by another name, and you are participating in the act of deception.
I see little room in these conversations for the public to learn something 
new—about the past or the present. And it is not just lay audiences who suffer, 
for fascism talk gives us a dose of something we do not need. Far-right studies 
suffers from a troubling tendency to relish certainty over curiosity and regularity 
over inconsistency. It is lop-sided where many other fields strive toward balance, 
directing its attention heavily in favour of the macro over the micro, the general 
over the particular, and preferring to emphasize sameness rather than differ-
ence when comparing actors across sociocultural context and history. These are 
prerequisites to issuing condemnations of our subject that are not only impas-
sioned, but simplistic. Multiple incentives drive this ur-paradigm, the most noble 
is the anxiety of understatement when dealing with political forces that can 
cause exceptional human suffering; as for physicians, the consequences of over-
diagnosis may appear miniscule compared with the opposite. But we are also 
lured by vanity and the promise that media will amplify our words and names if 
we escalate the charges against contemporary right-wing radicals.
I would think differently about ‘fascism’ were its contemporary usage some-
thing other than a lynchpin of this paradigm; instead it is the banner of our 
certitudes and the content in our proclamations of our subject’s regularity and 
dulness. I would think differently, also, were our field’s challenges of another 
kind, were they actually (as some critics allege) to be found in excess relativism 
and apologetics. Until that becomes the case I will seek out labels that do not 
attempt to explain so much and that deprive us the comfort of familiarity.
David Renton, independent scholar and author of Fascism: History 
and Theory (Pluto Press, 2020)
My sense is that most specialists did not believe that Trump was a fascist prior 
to 6 January 2021. His occupation of the White House had not significantly 
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increased the authoritarian resources of the US state, he did not build a 
one-party regime. What is more interesting to ask is therefore whether the 
coup of 6 January, had it been properly planned, would have taken him ‘over 
the edge’, to speak, converting a form of aggressive conservatism into some-
thing else?
One answer might be to recall that even the figures we know best, Hitler, 
Mussolini, Mosley, etc, were not born fascists but had to make themselves 
into the figures they became. We can imagine Trump poised between differ-
ent political strategies, facing his own insurgent right-wing people, and telling 
himself: This is the crowd which might yet save my Presidency. In those cir-
cumstances, the decision to take power through a coup rather than an election, 
would have been the recognisable act of a military dictator and potentially that 
of a fascist. Undoubtedly, it would have changed Trump. He would have given 
a pledge to his supporters and would have a debt to them afterwards. He would 
be the same person, with the same previous history, but the logic of his deci-
sion to take power outside an election would have changed him.
The problem with the above thoughts, of course, is that they are counter-
factuals. Plenty of others have been here before, imagining what almost hap-
pened but never did (Niall Ferguson’s Virtual History6 is a good example of the 
flaws of this genre). The coup failed; every impression is that it was not meant 
to ‘succeed’. It was a protest which found itself far closer to the symbols of 
power than its participants ever believed. The election was not close; the state 
never split.
There are two conclusions we could draw from this. Both address the sus-
ceptibility of our moment in history to capture by a violent, far-right. In one 
approach, the centre is surprisingly robust. It turns out that no plausible case 
could be made in favour of an American dictatorship. Even Trump-appointed 
judges and lawmakers would not consent to it.
In the other approach, we have just been given a warning, and not from his-
tory. Had the voting in the 2020 election been closer, so that a decent argument 
could have been made that the results were genuinely unclear, Trump would 
have faced a much more serious opportunity to keep himself in power. If so, we 
can assume that even more elected Republicans would have supported him, 
and even the armed forces might possibly have been split. At that point, the 
comparison with fascism would indeed have become meaningful.
We were supposed to be living in a post-fascist moment. It turns out that 
our society is more polarised, and more vulnerable to authoritarianism than 
we like to believe.
6 Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual history: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Picador, 1997).
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Nigel Copsey, Professor of Modern History, Teesside University
As the December 2020 special issue of Fascism bears out, the histories of fas-
cism and anti-fascism are ineluctably interwoven. Nonetheless, there is still 
a regrettable tendency amongst scholars of fascism, working with their own 
strict, and rarefied definitions, to demean anti-fascist activism for oversimpli-
fication, distortion, and misrepresentation.
So how did self-proclaimed anti-fascists in the US respond to events at 
Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021? There were those who, not unexpectedly, rushed 
to label it a ‘fascist coup’. The campaign group, Refuse Fascism, is one example. 
This group has, since its founding in the wake of Trump’s 2016 election, consist-
ently applied the term ‘fascism’ to the Trump/Pence administration. However, 
there are other self-proclaimed anti-fascists, many aligned to Antifa (which 
should be differentiated from Refuse Fascism), who are capable of offering a 
far more nuanced and sophisticated reading.
For It’s Going Down (igd), which is the leading digital platform for anar-
chist, anti-fascist, autonomous anti-capitalist and anti-colonial movements 
in the US, the crowd at Capitol Hill represented a coalition of ‘Trumpian 
forces’ and ‘fascists’ and were more precisely disaggregated into ‘Proud Boys, 
neo-Nazis, groypers, maga supporters, QAnon followers, covid-truthers, and 
militia members’.7 This was less an insurrection or revolt than a ‘permitted 
fascist temper tantrum’.8
As a historian drawn to researching anti-fascism (as well as fascism), I am 
very mindful that anti-fascists often subject their adversaries to misrepresenta-
tion. Yet anti-fascists can also be the subject of misrepresentation too, and in 
some cases, egregiously so. As we have seen, over the course of the last few years 
the Trump administration, and the Trump-supporting right-wing eco-system, 
have been instrumental in spreading disinformation about Antifa.
As late as 5 January 2021, Trump was still hankering for Antifa to be classi-
fied a ‘terrorist organisation’. On that day – the day before the now infamous 
‘Save America’ rally – Trump issued a presidential memorandum directing the 
Secretary of State to assess whether to classify Antifa a terrorist organisation 
7 ‘This Week in Fascism #91: Coalition of Fascist and Trumpian Forces Storm Capital,’ 
itsgoingdown.org, January 11, 2021, accessed February 12, 2021, https://itsgoingdown.org/
this-week-in-fascism-91-coalition-of-fascist-and-trumpian-forces-storms-capitol/.
8 ‘Neither an Insurrection or Revolt: An Anarchist Response to the Permitted Fascist Temper 
Tantrum,’ itsgoingdown.org, January 12, 2021, accessed February 12, 2021, https://itsgoingdown.
org/neither-insurrection-nor-revolt-anarchist-response-dc/.
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under 8 usc §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi), and to consider listing Antifa in 9 fam 302.5–
4(B)(2)(U), thereby denying entry to the United States of ‘aliens who have 
engaged or who are likely to engage in terrorist activity’. In one of his final 
presidential tweets, Trump warned:
Antifa is a Terrorist Organization, stay out of Washington. Law enforce-
ment is watching you very closely!
—donald j. trump (@realdonaldtrump) january 5, 2021.9
Whether or not the timing of this memorandum was deliberate – a way to 
excuse potential violence by his supporters against counter-protestors on 6 
January – is a moot point. Yet Antifa did not show. In their absence, rumours 
would later abound that Antifa had been amongst the Capitol rioters (a belief 
that forty per cent of respondents in one recent Anti-Defamation League poll 
thought true).
Needless to say, the ‘false-flag’ rumours were groundless (like many of the 
other spurious claims about Antifa that had preceded them). The reality, hav-
ing recently interviewed anti-fascists activists in the US, is that anti-fascists 
do exercise significant levels of restraint, both offline and online.10 Exercising 
restraint appears more challenging for right-wing extremists, who, accord-
ing to the adl’s Center on Extremism, were responsible for 90 per cent of all 
extremism-related murders in the United States in 2019. It is not for nothing 
that Antifa activists will tell you that fascism is an inherently violent ideology.
Raul Cârstocea, Honorary Fellow in European History, University of 
Leicester
Discussions of ‘fascism’ in our own time need to consider the fact that vic-
tory over fascism acted as the foundational myth of the post-war era on both 
sides of the Cold War, and certainly in the United States of America. Once 
established as a topos of ultimate evil and in that key decisively linked to Nazi 
9 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), ‘Antifa is a Terrorist Organization, stay out of 
Washington. Law enforcement is watching you very closely!’ Twitter, January 5, 2021, https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346583537256976385?ref_src=twsrc^tfw.
10 Nigel Copsey and Samuel Merrill, ‘Violence and Restraint within Antifa: A View from the 
United States,’ Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 6 (2020): 122–138, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/26964730.
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Germany rather than any other regime or movement, ‘fascism’ has become at 
once an extreme form of politics unlikely to be replicated in its exact histori-
cal manifestation, a label most of the contemporary far right except the very 
fringe will go to lengths to avoid, and a term of abuse for any unsavoury charac-
ters or organisations. Assessments of Trump as a ‘fascist’ have to navigate this 
unstable field, and the term of comparison for most academic and journalistic 
accounts has indeed been Nazi Germany (or, slightly more capaciously, Hitler 
and Mussolini).
Yet fascism as a political ideology covered a wide spectrum of individual 
actors and organisations, lacked an internationally unitary doctrine, and, 
due to its ultra-nationalism and insistence on its home-grown character, 
was always more context-specific than either socialism or liberalism. Its 
character also changed over time, was dependent on the position of the 
actors and their respective goals, which varied based on whether they were 
marginal organisations facing state opposition, large-scale movements with 
a serious bid to political power, or established regimes. Finally, while native 
fascisms differed greatly from Romania through Belgium to Britain, there 
were also ‘para-fascists’ and authoritarian regimes that adopted fascist ide-
ological or stylistic trappings without embracing fascism’s revolutionary 
impetus. It is against this background that I believe we need to conceptual-
ise Trump’s ‘fascism’ rather than against a simplistic ‘Hitler’ strawman, fac-
toring in also the specifically American roots of his politics, whether they 
be racism or anti-communism. Results may vary, as they say, and we can 
conclude with confidence that, whether or not a ‘fascist’ himself, which is 
becoming less relevant, Trump did radicalise the Republican Party consid-
erably and he did mobilise actual fascists to seek a violent overthrow of the 
establishment.
A final consideration is that fascism, like most other -isms, means differ-
ent things to specialists and laymen. It is certainly overused to condemn those 
who challenge liberal democracy, just as it is used as a misnomer for author-
itarianism, racism, antisemitism, or political violence. Here the role of the 
specialist is certainly one of providing more precision and clarity based on 
in-depth knowledge of historical fascism, some fundamental tenets discern-
ible beneath the fluidity of its numerous iterations. But it may also be not to 
be entirely dismissive of the ‘lay’ meanings and to try to understand instead 
the mechanisms that account for its staying power. This might bring us back 
to that foundational myth and prompt us to question whether its reassuring 
narrative is not a blind spot to mutated viral strains that may constitute the 2.0 
version of analogue fascism for our digital post-fascist present.
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Maria Bucur, Professor, History and Gender Studies, Indiana 
University Bloomington
The toxic charisma of Donald Trump swept through many spots of the world 
and took its toll on people in Eastern Europe along the way. In Romania, Trump 
was popular throughout his presidency with some small exceptions. He was 
simply America, and that meant not a communist and, in his case, definitely 
not a leftist. That made him more palatable from the perspective of a popu-
lation that had come to hate communism with passion, and included a small 
but constant fringe of fascists posing for decades as anti-communist resisters. 
Ioan Antonescu’s reputation is still pristine among a small group of enthusi-
asts, and Ioan Gavrilă Ogoranu, a fascist leader from the interwar period, still 
has a statue honouring him in downtown Deva.
The obsession with anti-communism has not receded in political and intel-
lectual life over the past three decades. There are many among the younger 
generations of urban and foreign educated inhabitants who have moved on 
from this dominant trope. The superb documentary Collective11 is a great 
example of what happens when one moves beyond this obsession and judges 
governance on the basis of contemporary institutions and aspirations toward 
transparency and serving the common good without bias and ‘lies told for 
power and for profit’.
But some prominent Romanians have remained enamoured with the notion 
that anti-communism is a crusade, just as the fascists stated in the 1940s. And some 
prominent academics, starting with the President of the Romanian Academy, 
Ioan Aurel Pop, have begun to combine this façade of anti-communism with dis-
cursive tropes close to the fascism of Ogoranu. A tribalist view of the Romanian 
family and society has gained increasing prominence in the public pronounce-
ments of the President of the Academy, and accusations of cosmopolitism and 
globalism as forms of totalitarian control, equating them with communism and 
as Soros infiltrators, have started to slide towards essentialist fascist tropes.
A little over a decade ago, Sorin Lavric, then a rising star in the Romanian 
intellectual scene, won a major prize from the Romanian Academy for a study 
that was hailed as nuanced, balanced, and profound in its insights.12 It was a 
book dedicated to understanding the relationship between Constantin Noica, 
a prominent philosopher who participated in the fascist movement, and the 
11 Alexander Nanau, Collective (2019).
12 Mirel Horodi, ‘Un răspuns evaziv al Academiei,’ Observator cultural, no. 510, January 28, 
2010, accessed April 13, 2021, https://www.observatorcultural.ro/articol/un-raspuns-evaziv- 
al-academiei/.
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Legion of the Archangel Michael. A number of scholars criticized the book 
for its ‘balanced’ view of the legionary movement, whose magnetism Lavric 
seems to go out of his way to explain in ways that suggest sympathies with the 
movement. And yet the book was also defended by many scholars in Romania 
and some overseas, where it was praised without reservation by other experts 
on ‘moderation’.
Since December 2020, Lavric has become an open apologist for antise-
mitic, racist, misogynist, and anti-vaccine views espoused by the Alliance for 
Romanian Unification (aur) party with which he has chosen to affiliate as a 
stepping stone towards a seat in the Senate. He now promises to start a war that 
will do away with the current political class. Lavric’ party was proud to declare 
in December that they fully supported Trump, at a time when the President 
was challenging the democratic outcomes of the US election. More recently, 
one analysis described Lavric as a ‘known apologist for Romanian fascism’.
The surfacing of fascist sympathies may have been facilitated by Trump, but 
they represent an older current that has gathered strength from the praises and 
general acceptance of such perspectives as part of the mainstream of scholarly 
production or cultural life. There is no reason to believe they will now subside. 
Trump is gone, but Lavric continues to publish in a prominent weekly literary 
journal and to participate in political life. In the US, the Charlottesville com-
munity has drawn a line in the sand and stated that, in dealing with Trump and 
the January 6th insurrection, accountability and justice have to precede unity. 
In Romania, accountability survives like a potted orchid, in small curated 
spaces, like documentary films.
Brian Hughes, Associate Director at the Polarization and 
Extremism Research and Innovation Lab (peril) at American 
University
Debates over the fascist merits of Trumpism have tended to concentrate on 
four conditions of dispute: 1) Trumpism’s ambitions versus 2) its achieve-
ments 3) as a political-institutional regime and 4) as a cultural movement. 
The most heated debates seem to move effortlessly across these sectors, 
sometimes speaking past one another, sometimes resolving into antimonies 
of reason, in which either argument appears correct enough on its own mer-
its yet remains incapable of either disproving or reconciling its opposition. 
I propose that these categories can be usefully realigned in Lacanian terms, 
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which may help to resolve these antimonies. According to such a realign-
ment, debate related to ideology and policy would belong to the register of 
the Symbolic. Here one might consider immigration under Trump, its conti-
nuities with Obama-era policy, and its function to create a class of Muslims 
and nonwhite Hispanics as homo sacer/the enemy within. Alternatively, 
debates best sorted into the register of the Real would be those concerning 
the inarticulable horror (or its absence) of actual events in the Trump pres-
idency. Here one considers the forced rendition of protesters or the mass 
libidinal discharge of a Trump rally.
And here the Lacanian realignment exposes a critical gap in the preced-
ing debates, that is, a tendency to neglect the register of the Imaginary. One 
may speculate as to why this is so. It seems that in debates which pit politi-
cal scientists and historians against themselves and one another, media the-
orists have (for whatever reason) largely abstained. Yet media images offer 
a rich vein of evidence pointing to the fascistoid character of the Trumpist 
Imaginary. Consider the ‘God Emperor’ meme, which portrayed the president 
as a golden-haired cyborg messiah from the fantasy wargame Warhammer 
40k. This image appeared 9,602 times from 2015 – 2019 on 4chan alone. Or 
we might turn to the cartoons of Ben Garrison, where Trump is depicted as a 
smirking trickster with a bodybuilder’s physique. More prosaically, we might 
consider the image of Trump as reality tv star and hero of his own autobiog-
raphies: an omnipotent captain of industry. Here we encounter not Trump the 
man but Trump the image — a fantasy ideal ego which his followers yearn to 
reflect. In the register of the Imaginary, where the Ur-capitalist god emperor 
resides, Trump not only meets the criteria of charismatic strongman proposed 
by Paxton and Payne, he exceeds them. In the capacity of a cosmic messiah, 
he not only meets the palingenetic criteria set forth by Griffin, he transcends 
them.
Of course, this does not resolve debates pertaining to the registers of the 
Symbolic and Real, but it does inform them. The Lacanian triad is inextricably 
linked and mutually influencing. Thus, questions of policy cannot be consid-
ered absent consideration of image, as the desires of the Symbolic proceed 
from the demands of the Imaginary. Nor can the horrors of the Trumpist Real 
be considered absent their Imaginary counterparts, as the needs (met or unful-
filled) that suffuse our experience of the Real provide the ground on which the 
fantasy figures of the Imaginary stand. By reorienting and expanding the ques-
tion of Trumpism’s fascist merits, we may yet do justice to this largely neglect-
ed—yet crucially important—dimension of the debate.
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Roger Griffin, Emeritus Professor, Oxford Brookes University
In many areas the gulf between academic and media knowledge – especially 
social media knowledge – resembles Africa’s Great Rift Valley. Ever since 
Trump first exchanged the studios of reality tv for the world of surreality 
politics the word ‘fascism’ has hovered around his personal style of presi-
dency like pesky midges. Constantly reached for by bloggers and journalists, 
their persistent use of it unwittingly blurs important differences between 
non-revolutionary and genuinely revolutionary forms of the far right when 
characterizing Trump’s particular brand of populism. To make matters worse 
it has been sanctioned in the US by some high-profile academics such as 
Jason Stanley, Sarah Churchwell, Enzo Traverso and Federico Finkelstein.
Since the 1990s, a growing consensus has emerged within ‘liberal aca-
demia’ that fascism is a revolutionary form of ultranationalism that is not 
just driven by the desire to return the nation to an utterly mythical state of 
former greatness. Instead, it aspires to create a new, totalizing, postliberal, 
ethnically based national or international order purged of multiculturalism 
and pluralism. This was a project that Trump was far too simple-minded, 
racist, impulsive, narcissistic, materialistic, aporophobic (contemptuous 
of the poor), and Quixotic (not to say mentally unstable and delusional) in 
his thought processes to undertake. Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, he was far 
too concerned with self-aggrandizement to be a revolutionary strategist and 
leader and create the nucleus of a future leadership. Any sort of coherent 
ideology or political strategy of the sort needed for structural change was 
beyond him. In a way, to call Trump a fascist is an insult to fascism.
Obviously, other political constituencies saw him as fascist. Movements 
of the radical left such as Refuse Fascism did, hoping that the prospect of a 
Republican coup might galvanize the masses into a carrying out a Marxist rev-
olution. Many in the alt-right saw him as one of theirs, an assumption encour-
aged by Trump’s perverse response to the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally 
and his exhortation to the Proud Boys to ‘stand by’ in the debate with Biden 
(a request they complied in the Capitol incursion). Certainly, Trump displayed 
some of the ‘antis’ of fascism: misogyny, xenophobia, Islamophobia, the rhet-
oric of restoring a lost national greatness, populist appeals to chauvinism: but 
it was not consistently ‘ultra-nationalistic’, striving to create an organic (and 
hence ethnically exclusive) national community beyond the limits of democ-
racy in a new order. Instead, his egomania led him to ride slipshod over core 
Enlightenment principles such as the separation of powers, due process, trans-
parency, accountability of power, and respect for the letter and spirit of the 
constitution.
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So, what of Trumpism? A rabble made up of so many heterogenous elements 
from Catholic conservatives and apocalyptic Dispensationalists to survivalists, 
nra fanatics, neo-Nazis and outlandish QAnon conspiracy theorists (most of 
whom disbanded once their saviour failed to defeat Biden and condemned the 
assault on the Capitol a ‘heinous attack’) can hardly be seen as a ‘movement’, 
let alone a cohesive ideological and political force. Trumpism may be a form 
of ‘paranoid right’ but not a fascist right. By encouraging the mob to storm the 
building Trump was being, not a fascist leader, but an ‘ochlocrat’. Yet liberal 
humanists should take no comfort from Trump’s lack of fascist credentials.
By spending four years crowbarring apart constitutional democracy from 
the liberalism and civil liberties that humanists, secular and religious, have 
struggled for over two centuries to weld together into ‘liberal democracy’, 
Trumpism and other forms of identitarian, ethnocentric populism have argu-
ably posed a greater, more insidious threat to the credibility of democracy 
world-wide and the prospects for a sustainable world order than revolutionary 
extremism (which could have been efficiently put down by a display of state 
power). The digital pundits obsessed with Trump’s putative fascism would be 
advised to devote more time to threats to liberal humanism emanating from 
within the parliamentary spectrum of politics, and perhaps spare a moment to 
check out the present state of fascist studies before irresponsibly raising spec-
tres of interwar totalitarianism.
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